An Era of Extra-Ordinary Prosperity

So what to make of the current economic situation? What sense to take of it? Or what sense to take of it from looking at the times through a historical lens, since I imagine most readers will prefer my analysis, at least in part, because of my historical perspective rather than simply my sunny personality (although it is quite sunny).

First, let me recommend you to an excellent article that prompted me to write on this topic (and therefore certainly has some influence over the contents of this post), which has some fine points that I'll probably re-iterate to some extent. The Economist has a nice rundown of the situation in the article called "Working Man's Blues"

Now for my overview:

Well, as a historian who has studied a decent deal, although not a great deal, of material about the Great Depression, I can tell you this isn't the Great Depression. We don't have the majority of the country poor or going toward poverty, we have most of the country middle class, and some perhaps tilting toward lower middle class, with a rather small number in extreme poverty and an uncomfortably high, but not that high, a number in relative poverty. Most importantly we have not had any negative growth, thus technically we are not even in a recession (by the traditional definition, used in, for example Investor Words, a recession is two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP change).

No this is not a recession, and it is not as Paul Krugman claimed a return to the Guilded Age.

(even ignoring his arguments, he gets the periodization wrong, or at least without providing arguments sets up a different periodization than almost all major historians. The Guilded Age was roughly between the end or the faltering of the Reconstruction (around 1877 when federal troops left the South) and probably at most the assassination of McKinley (ie, the beginning of Teddy Roosevelt's term in 1901), it does not last into the 1920's as Krugman claims, and the Progressive Era is usually dated between around 1901 and around 1920, not starting in the late 1920's or early 1930's as Krugman implies.)

This is an economic downturn. We had something of a boom between say 2003-2007, not as much as say in the 1990's, where we had an extraordinary boom (one of the few eras where real median household income grew, although that measure, like most is questionable, especially given the number of poor immigrants that come to the US), and now there's a downturn. The size of this downturn is rather massive, compounded by problems in economies around the world, high oil and food prices, and the economy-distorting measures taken to reduce the last downturn in 2000 (such as Greenspan's massive intrest rate cutting.))

But that's just looking at it from a historical perspective, looking backwards many years, we can see that, you know what, even in a downturn, we are still at a level of wealth rarely seen in the life of mankind. That can be said for the world especially, but in the US we have the majority of the population with a degree of financial security, although they need to work and worry to keep it, which nowadays means the necessities are satisfied, health is alright, + (and this is actually very historically rare) we have machines and tools to make daily life easier + we have machines and tools to keep us entertained. Taking the long view from the past, that's pretty good, average man-wise.

(That's the tricky thing, because we have to remember, historically the middle class was not the average man. The average man used to be what was then called the working class, which would nowadays be considered the working poor (the current working class is more the middle class). I suppose the definition of the middle class for previous eras was financial security, having the necessities, and being able to aspire to more, or maybe it's just a semi-Marxist vision, those who are not dependent on the means of production of someone else, but who do not themselves own the means of production, perhaps, perhaps, perhaps)

Taking the view of the future though... things are a bit odd right now. Despite all the nations of the world being in essentially one global economy, each country seems to exist in a different world economically, in a way that has little to do with the economic realities of the country. But these oddities always have a bit of sense, and are generally rooted in a very specific past.

For example, why is the US so prosperous now relative to the world? Explaining fully its situation in the 19th century relative to Latin America might be a bit tough, but to a great deal it helped that the ethnic groups which did the discriminating, though the mix shifted, tended to always been a vast majority in the US, which has not been the case in much of Latin American history (the situation of the South as economically backward during this period partially backs this theory). But let's not go back that far, let's just look at the beginning of the 20th century it was on the higher end of the income scales, but similar to Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Argentina and perhaps a few other exceptional Latin American economies. However, it was not devastated by WWII, nor did it suffer from radical economic deviations, and moreover it didn't have to deal with imperialism, or major revolutions. That alone would give the US quite an edge over the rest of the world, whether it explains everything is question, but it explains a lot of the particular oddity of the massive US share of the global GDP.

Similar stories of exceptional luck history wise can be found scattered around the world. Yes, this luck was built on hard work, the US' low-revolution count was built on a strong belief in democracy in the political class and especially among some of the better of our leaders. But we got lucky with WWII, had Latin America gotten involved, as some Latin American countries wanted to, we might have been as devastated as Europe.

Yet historical luck is not a way to build a lasting prosperity. And despite whatever good qualities of the American people might have, we are not so exceptional as to have the economic fundamentals to maintain our privileged position in the world, and thus relative to the world we are sinking. I had hoped that it might be the case that the world might be catching up fast enough that in absolute terms we would still maintain our lifestyle for the immediate future, but that may be a bit uncertain. I suppose that's not surprising, after all, when the working class caught up to and merged with the middle class, the middle class did lose a lot of their old perks, such as even the lower middle class having servants.

But let me not be too gloomy. We might be destined to sink somewhat relative to the rest of the world until we reach a point reflecting our size, resources, skills and attributes, but that place is still pretty high in the world. Moreover, even if things might even be sinking in absolute terms, the future still holds the potential to raise us up with the rest of the world, even if perhaps at a slower speed. And then once a bit of the adjusting is done for the past, perhaps then we can grow naturally, with our long-term growth being reflective of the long-term economic trends of our nation. Until then...
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But as I said things aren't so bad now, and while the future might have some roughness, it is unlikely to hold a new Great Depression any time soon (although I'd advise against any predictions going to infinity). The true reality that we are going to face though, is that economic moments, like all moments, pass, and the situations change, and control of the course of events will always allude us.

But that just means that history will always be surprising.

History keeps on moving... Into the future

Sorry about the posting irregularity, or well, not that sorry. I have had a good reason for being sporadic, since I'm searching for a job. Now a history major isn't a bad thing job-wise. It's a standard liberal arts major with a decent reputation for difficulty (on the other hand, English, unjustly so, has a reputation for being easy (although it is a plus when applying for writing related jobs), now Sociology, again, in my book, unjustly so, has a reputation for being more difficult than history). So the standard liberal arts jobs are open to me: Sales, Marketing, Teaching, Insurance, etc. + Grad School (of various sorts, not just History grad studies, but also Law School, Accounting, School of Ed., etc.). However, unfortunately, none of those appeals to me at the moment (although I'm starting to consider grad school, but not for the immediately, more for the some day).

What I'm looking for in particular is a job that combines my creativity and analytical sides (hopefully, but not necessarily, in a way that also takes advantage of my historical side), as well as utilizing my technical side. Now there are jobs out there like that, and indeed, I very much believe, there are many of those jobs that are well suited for someone like me. But the employers don't necessarily realize that! I mean, once I sell myself to a recruiter, I generally get a good feeling from them (even if that doesn't necessarily translate to a job), but when recruiters just glance at my resume, they're usually thinking to themselves "History major... hmmm... can't have any technical skills). Well, I think this blog testifies otherwise (my other blog more math and CS-centric, makes an even stronger case).

But among all these complaints, you might be asking yourself, why didn't he get a technical-oriented major. (that sentence actually does not need a question mark since it is a statement of a situation involving a question, rather that a question itself, Mr. I-Think-I-Know-Grammar Pants)

Well, I could have. Had I spent an extra year or so at Rutgers (Rutgers rules! Wooo!), I could very well have gotten a double major in History and Computer Science. However, honestly, job-wise a year of experience might be better than the promotion of a CS minor to a CS major, and I was eager to exit college, at least for a while. But more importantly, to be truthful, while technical subjects do appeal to me (and maybe after some time in the work-world I might go for a technical grad degree), they don't sing to me the same way History does.

Ah, History, the great study of all that ever was, which is the cornerstone of all that ever will be.

And yet... I do like CS and Math and other such stuff. And to continue to be truthful, I am a bit of a dabbler when it comes to History; I have yet to find a specialty, and my record shows classes whose subject matters range across the world.

In the end, at least at this moment, I remain as I have for as long as I can remember, a jack-of-all-trades and a master of none.

Which isn't a bad thing necessarily, this precarious position allows me to indulge in any interest that comes my way, to soak up knowledge in any field which I happen upon, and to switch subjects with ease and pleasure. But of practical importance, being a jack-of-all-trades gives me a somewhat rare perspective on things and makes synthesizing subjects, as well as explaining one subject to another, as natural as breathing in and out the air.

Yet employability-wise, the jack-of-all-trades is not a clear classification, and is often hard for recruiters to wrap their brains around, and yet...

I have good skills, a decent brain, some inspired moments, and a friendly disposition, so I imagine the job hunt will eventually end well for me. However, the hunting is likely to be long and tiresome as well, but such is the way of the world, and so I press on, armed with the knowledge of the past, into the future.

A matter of empire

What is an empire? What is an emperor? In the political and historical lexicon this is thrown around a lot, but does the word 'empire' have any real meaning? Well, no, not really, it just seems to mean nowadays very powerful state, or maybe expanding state, or maybe state with extensive influence.

But let's step back a sec and look at the older meanings. Why? Well, this isn't really a historical definition question, but it's still something fun to think about.

Well, the word 'emperor' comes from the name 'imperator' which just meant commander (although the Roman Emperor took it as his title, emphasizing his military role) and 'empire' probably just comes from 'emperor'. But if we look at emperors in other lands, a common title, used in both the ancient Persian Empire and the Ethiopian Empire in its better days is King of Kings (obviously the local language equivalent like šāhān šāh or Nəgusä Nägäst). And then if we look at the case of say the Holy Roman Emperor, he was more really the case of a king above the princes. Furthermore even the Roman Emperor ruled over semi-autonomous provinces and client kingdoms, (although the extent of his power over much of the territory matches nicely with the title of 'king', the Romans hated the idea of a king, associating it with ancient tyranny and they liked to pretend otherwise).

But in summary, what empire really seems to historically mean is a ruler who ruled over many semi-independent kingdoms and prince-ships. Which actually means that emperors, while traditionally ruling over more extensive territories than kings, were often far less powerful over the full extent of their territories.

Now using this as a political science concept might be useful, but there are so many other examples of historic kingdoms which don't match that concept of empire, so it's kind of iffy to use it for history, but... well...

YOU'RE STINKY!!!

And I've got the history to prove it!

Check it out now: The History's Your Brother

I've been adding some more features and a new layout. I added some links for my history professors and some history resources, as well as some random stuff and such. Hopefully it's all pumped up in coolness, but there's still extra coolness it can get, because History's just soooo awesome.

Civilized, Smivilized!

Now, in this modern world, modernity has gotten a bad name.

And the precursor to the term modern (like its successor developed is destined to), civilized, has also been criticized, both its existence as a value and its value as a virtue.

The term civilized once justified horrific, horrific acts and so it's easy to say let's throw it away... and yet civilization as a concept does have a value. There is an essential difference

(not necessarily good or bad, but which might actually be, depending on how you want to debate things, but that's a question of philosophy not necessarily history (although there are plenty of history/philosophy hybrids, and while history is never purely objective, we should recognize the difference between an effort toward an objective history and not attempting the objectivity in a history/philosophy /opinion project)

between the Roman Empire as a society or the ancient Germanic peoples as a society, and while it is different from the difference between the ancient Persians and the ancient Scythians as societies, it is related to that difference and related differences.

That's a very vague way of saying things, but my basic point is that between civilizations you can make out categories based on some quality that divides those societies traditionally called civilized and those traditionally called non-civilized.

So let us now re-take up the topic. We must be careful of the mistakes of the past such as Euro-centrism or Sino-centrism, but we can also learn from the past. The greatest problem with previous attempts was the vagueness of the term and its association with the values and virtues of the areas called civilized. Let us then explicitly say what we mean and not claim to represent the past meanings of the word but try for a new definition which while aiming for the same subject does not necessarily mean the same thing as previous usages of "civilized."

After all this you might say, well get to the heart of the matter already.

Okay, fine then, bully.

Now I am valuing civilization as a matter of society, not necessarily of economy or state-structure, although these might be a consequence.

While as I said I am not trying to define the same intuitive concept that was used before, but as I also said, I am dealing with the same essential subject. So let us examine the commonality of those societies that match fit the intuitive concept.

Rome, Persia, Han China, Maurya India, all fit a certain level in the intuitive concept of soceity, and there greatest commonality is you have there people living together in greater density and with more durable traditions of living together as well as a stronger connection with older previous worlds (this is separate from being old unto itself, after all Roman society is no where nearly as old as Persian, but it connected with Greek). Also, essential to this are traditions of cultural production, and material production, moreover even the exceptions in this regard have refined reasons for this or refined compensation methods.

So then let me try to sketch up some categories.

Most basic civilization level - familial tribes - there is a direct family or personal connection between all members of even the largest social units. There is no great tradition of people dealing with other people and so new contacts must be improvised. Basically isolated hunter-gatherers.

Next - formal tribes - there might still be some uncertain kinship connections, but social ties are more based on common traditions than direct relations. Still such traditions are not widespread. While there are large cultural units based on long-standing traditions, they are mostly only between people who have networks of direct or regional contact. There is little conception of the world outside the region or lifestyle. More developed tribal units, some light farmers or rotating farmers. Early Central Asian nomads.

Next - ritualized tribes - cultural traditions reach indefinitely and widely. People know how to deal with each other and outsiders, and there are set rituals of interactions. Later Central Asian nomads.

Next - basic cities - still without deep interconnection, but there are concentrations of population that act as cultural centers of the surrounding area.

Next - developed cities - cities and small societies know how to deal with each other and have rituals of interaction and both peaceful and war-like relations within their cultural zone.

Next - political regions - societies have regular social organizations, regular distribution of assets, know how to deal with outsiders for a long while, usually some degree of literacy or something similar.

Next - high culture - There are rituals of great production and traditions of reasoning about actions and culture. Thinkers and specialized epics

Next - old culture - long tradition of cultural succession and relation. Centralized culture centers

Next - world culture - interconnected fully with their surroundings, dominating any surrounding lesser cultural areas and ritualized interaction with other equal civilizations. Interacting cultural centers.

Next - world-spanning culture - exporting culture and exchanging culture. Massive cities that act naturally as and also interact with cultural centers.

Next - integrating culture - developing not only from their own development but through the development of others. Metropolitan areas around cities.

Next - semi-globalized culture - a single culturally connected region among all people who have had some contact with others in this region, there are still barriers to full exchange, but these barriers can be transmitted. Metropolitan regions connecting many cities. Current world.

Next- fully globalized culture - all knowledge is accessible, all distance can be traveled, barriers between cultures are no greater than internal barriers, easily connected transport between continental metropolitan areas and some relatively easy transport between all metropolitan areas. Post-industrial world.

So there's some preliminary definitions, do they need adjusting? Yes. But still I think the categories are useful. They measure something very real in a society's changes. And when comparing cultures and mapping out historical changes this can be very valuable indeed.

And if you think differently say so, or be a bum. Bummmmmmmmmmmm!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Happy St. Thomas' Day

Courtesy of my mother I'd like to give a quick rundown of the history of Christianity in that little SW corner of India called Kerala.

In brief, the St. Thomas Christians remained pretty much as one group until 1599 (Diampur Synod), when Portugese Bishop did a hostile takeover of Syrian Christians. But Portugese power waned and in 1653, some of the new Christians could not take the loss of traditional worship. They revolted and had a pledge to go back to Orthodox worship and tradition.Thus the Syrian Orthodox Church was formed. My family part of the church remained in Roman Catholicism and revived little bit of old tradition. They are Syro-Malabar church. Portugese missionaries also converted lot of Hindus from 1498 onwards and this group is called Latin Catholics.

The Syrian Orthodox church split into several factions. One faction under the Bishop Mar Evanios re-joined Catholic church in 1930. Achacha' family and our New Jersey church belongs to this group. This is called Malankara Syrian Catholic Church

So remember Roman Catholic Church in Kerala has three groups or independent 'rites' or form of worship. The The Latin rite, Syro-Malabar rite and Malankara Syrian catholic rite. I should say four, if I include the Kananya Church.

The Syrian Orthodox Church that remained away from the catholic church has three other famous factions: One is called the Othodox Church to which belongs Shaji Achacha's family. They have large congregations in the US and Achacha's friend Thankanchan uncle's family also belongs to this one.

Now there are 17 million Catholics in India, 7 million are Syrian Christians, about 500,000 are Malankara Syrian Catholic.

I was for years trying to figure out where these different factions arise and how they are connected. Now it is all easy to find out from Wikipedia.

And that's my mother (Thresia Thomas)!

Secrets are me-cret, I suppose

So let me let you in on a little secret (not really a secret, more of a piece of advice), universities have a lot of free info and stuff. But you might say hey I don't go to a university. Well, okay that might limit you a little, but the trick is to go to professors' pages. You can usually get a ton of free explanations and guides and history facts from professors' pages, and usually they have little to no checking. Hey, probably professors' like to have random people check out their subject-matter. You don't want to let the professors down, do you?

History is a mess, but I love it

I do apologize for the major break in my schedule, but circumstances do intervene.

Still let me wax poetic a little about history.

Or rather I would if there was a strong tradition of history poems nowadays. It's sad that this noble tradition seems in decline or if found in disarray.

Alack, alack, alack.

And what of poetic history plays? Whatever happened to those? Are they just a memory of history?

Just a momentary aberration?

Perhaps, perhaps, perhaps.

But let me call at least for a revisiting of great history poems and plays.

For when history stirs your soul,

What magnificence shall emerge?

The Great Companion of Man

War. I was tempted to do a bad pun, like starting out with: war what is it good for, etc. But that seemed disrespectful, especially given the context in which that song was written (that's one of the burdens of knowing the history behind these songs, I imagine the many comedic videos, such as the Rush Hour trailer, were likely (although not necessarily) made by people who weren't thinking about the historical context of the song (Just to given some more exact information the song in question is "War" by Edwin Starr, written in 1970 in protest of the Vietnam War)). (Actually one of my annoyances with many journalists is their disrespectful use of puns, like for example saying the cultural changes in China are a "Cultural Revolution," I mean it's somewhat forgivable if the article focuses on the differences between the Cultural Revolution and Chinese culture today, but really...)

Actually writing about war is always a dicey endeavor, but people have written about it and in many, many different ways. You can take a funny angle to it (MASH, Hogan's Heroes, etc.), a satirical angle to it (Dr. Strangelove, etc.), a tragic angle to it (Letters from Iwo Jima, etc.), a triumphant angle to it (Glory, etc.), and there are more ways of looking at war. In fact, I say with a decent amount of certainty that war can be written from any perspective of the human experience, because war is so central to the human experience. That's a bit of a weighty, vague sentence, but essentially, war is when humans dispose of some or all of the basic rules of conduct in pursuit of some goal put higher than not only their lives, but the lives of entire peoples.

Yet, the human experience should not be reduced to war. Often that is the prelude to the common 19th century belief that war was not only the great companion of man, but his essential lover. No, humans can pursue just goals just as passionately and just as successfully within the rules of society that prevent such catostrophic conduct. In fact, if one of those just goals is the appreciation of the beauty of the human spirit, war is best avoided.

But one would be naive, and again, disrespectful to ignore war and its impact on history. Wars are often decisive events in the shaping of people and states, and when they are not, that is an immensely important fact unto itself. And thus the historian must be familiar with war, must not flinch from blood nor from horror, and must stare into the abyss, taking care not to let the abyss penetrate his soul.

With that melodramatic introduction, let me give some quick facts for those who enjoy or find useful quick facts. Here is a brief summary of the wars of the United States of America (I apologize that many of the conflicts are generalized, I will try to go into them more particularly later, but I ended up spending more time than I planned covering the general essence of the historian and war).

1775-1783 - The American Revolutionary War

1783-1794 - Conflicts and Rebellions related to the establishment of the US federal and state governments

1798-1800 - Quasi-War

1775-1900 - Wars with various Native American powers, often connected with the wars with Britain, intensifying in 1865-1900

1812-1815 - War of 1812

1846-1848 - Mexican-American War (some might include the Texas Revolution 1835-1836 as part of this, although Texas was not part of the US till 1845)

1861-1865 - American Civil War

1893 - Semi-Intervention against Hawaii

1898 - Spanish-American War

1898 - 1913 - Philippine-American War (till 1902) and suppression of remnants

1903 - Semi-Intervention against Columbia for Panama

1916 - 1917 - Punitive Expedition against Mexico

1907 - 1933 - Latin American Interventions

1917 - 1918 - World War I

1918 - 1920 - Russian Intervention

1941 - 1945 - World War II

1945 - 1981 - Cold War Conflicts

1950 - 1953 - Korean War

1959 - 1975 - Second Indo-Chinese War (Vietnam War, Cambodian and Laos Interventions)

1979 - Grenada Intervention

1982 - 1984 - Lebanon Intervention

1991 - Persian Gulf War

1992 - Somali Intervention

1994 - Haiti Intervention in support of Aristite

1995 - Bosnian Intervention

1998 - Iraq Bombing Campaign

1999 - Kosovo Intervention

2003 - Liberian Intervention

2004 - Haiti Intervention - escorting Aristite out of the country


2003 - Current - Iraq War


Sorry for the briefness, but I got carried away with the intro. I hope to expand on all of this later, but till then, the History is out there.

The art of revision

One of the greatest insults among historians, or one of the greatest badges of honor for historians of a certain stripe, is revisionist.

The revisionist's essence is that they rebel against old research, which they believe is ideologically slanted beyond any worth, by creating all new research and a new point of view on the history, which, despite a usual protestation of less bias than the past, somehow agrees with their ideological point of view.

The essential flaw of revisionist in its purest is that they discard all the old research and create history so ideologically slanted that it's almost impossible for those not sharing the ideology to read it without a burst of vomit shooting up their stomachs.

But to be fair, the revisionist is usually correct, to a lesser degree though, about the bias of the old research, and moreover the revisionist often has new research that has a few gems of useful information.

In the end though, I object terribly to any throw out all the old movement, and revisionism is one of them. There are so many points to object to, but I think I covered most of the major ones in my description. My point essentially is that old, consensus research, while biased often, usually has at least some worth that should not be discarded.

Having said all that, let me come to the newest bit of revisionism. Although revisionist usually belong to the left-wing of politics, they also inhabit the right-wing, and this figure belongs firmly in the latter. Pat Buchannan has written a history book that to a greater or lesser extent almost certainly belongs in the revisionist column. Since I've been dealing with essences largely so far, let me get to the essence of his book. WWII could have been avoided if we just let Nazi Germany take Poland.

I have to say I don't have his argument down precisely, you can check it out on Amazon.com if you'd like. I may read it, but I might find that I can only stomach a summary. The key problem with his logic I think, or if not with the logic of his book, the logic of much of his rhetoric, is that he assumes strong nations have the right to sacrifice weak nations.

Morally, that's monstrous, geopolitically, that will cost you in terms of bitterness and the future changing position of countries.

But just to strike at one argument to shoot at his book, without even reading it, admittedly, and if someone has read it and like to shoot this argument down, feel free to:

Nazi Germany was part of the Axis pact with at the time. Even if Germany would have been satisfied with Poland (which it wouldn't have been), other Axis powers such as Italy and Hungary were moving on their own territorial ambitions, notably Greece and Transylvania. It is very hard to imagine that Yugoslavia would not get involved in the mix, and then the European geopolitical situation would be reduced to this:

Portugal, Spain, France, Britain, Scandanavia, Switzerland, Axis powers, USSR. Envision that for a second, and realize that you have there Hitler lying surrounded by passively or actively hostile enemies with very rebellious territories barely under his control. It is hard not to imagine the war widening.

But to attack something further. Pat Buchanan combines in his argument that the reason why WWII was so sad, is because it cost Britain its empire. Screw the British Empire. It did provide some marginal improvement in SOME situations, but it was an oppressive, exploitive regime and it needed to fall.

The Cold War was awful, it really was, but you can't let that get you nostalgic for colonialism and imperialism. Imperialism was just wrong Pat. It was just wrong.

If there were only a few more Ruskies

So here's a new segment.

Grand historical question time.

So all you history buffs out there, let me give you a thinker...

Now Russia in the first World War lost more people than any other combatant. Moreover, many of these were Russia's best and brightest. Some historians (including I believe, Orlando Figes) have cited Russia's lack of a strong middle position party between the militarist White Russians and the Bolshevik-led Reds in the Russian Civil War as the cause of the Bolshevik victory. Many of those historians have assumed this was then due to Russia's incomplete industrial revolution (often using a progress/stages version of history which I'm always suspicious of).

But what if there was the potential for a middle position party? What if there were dynamic youths who could have led a new faction of Russians who could overcome the Reds and charm/defeat the Whites... that is if they hadn't been killed in the early years of the first World War.

The early years of the first World War gutted the Russian officer class, and the military was often the best route for advancement for upwardly-mobile Russians. If it hadn't been for all that slaughter, perhaps the even greater slaughters to follow might have been avoided.

If the idea is true, it adds another layer of tragedy to early 20th century history, but perhaps it also gives us a new way to interpret the Russian Revolution. And then the lessons derived from the birth of the Soviet Union might need some rethinking as well...

Perhaps...
Perhaps...
Perhaps...

Tipu, if not Sultan then what?

My brother's doing a report on Tipu Sultan, and since he is a most fascinating character I thought I might share a little on the man with you.

But here I'd like to display a little of my oft-maligned superpower, random history knowledge off the top of my head, so there will be no references here, there will be perhaps a few errors, ah, but this should be interesting. (I'll try to give a more researched overview of Tipu Sultan in the future)

First of all, for those who do not know, Tipu Sultan was the ruler of the Kingdom of Mysore in the late 18th century. Mysore now is a city in the Indian state of Karnataka (I did look up the proper spelling there, but just so I could avoid any offense), but it once was a center of a Kingdom that covered perhaps a good 1/3 to 1/2 of South India. Tipu Sultan was not born of the line of Mysore Maharaja's that are there today. Rather his father overthrew that line, which was restored after Tipu Sultan's death.

It is interesting then to note that Tipu Sultan was essentially a usurper, and the fight between him and the British was between two usurpers, ah, but India in those days was a land of usurpers.

In those days of the late 18th century, the British East India Company was near hegemony (although not quite dominance) in North India and was making deep in roads into South India. The great forces which could oppose it, such as the Mughal Empire or the Maratha Confederacy were in steep decline. The French remained even their influence was starting to drop. One striking exception (there were a few others such as the Sikh's to the northwest and the Afghans, but those are other stories), was the Kingdom of Mysore. Whereas other powers were declining, Mysore was ascendant, and Tipu Sultan was an important cause of that ascent.

There were other causes, such as the wise management of his father, the key location of Mysore in trade routes, and Mysore's position within the Franco-British contest, but Tipu Sultan was a strong ruler. He centralized the state, abolished the tax farmers, modernized the military, essentially accomplished all those steps which would save the monarchies of Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Thailand in later years. In short he was a formidable foe to the British expansion on the subcontinent.

The details of the Anglo-Mysore wars are beyond off-my-head knowledge, but they did involve the future Duke of Wellington, who was prouder of his victories here than those in Europe. But to summarize, while the first was a draw, the second saw Mysore gain, and the third saw Mysore weakened, and the fourth left Mysore a British dependency and Tipu Sultan dead.

The difficulty of defeating Tipu Sultan and that tantalizing counter-factual of his victory continues to taunt historians. Unlike some of the more recent historians, I do not wish to romanticize Tipu Sultan. He was ruthless, the surrounding states of South India were justified to be afraid of him and probably got better deals from the British to oppose him than Tipu would have given them. Moreover, he did devastate the countryside of Malabar in his campaigns there. Yet he was a strong and talented ruler, who did shape and develop his kingdom well. And he represents an alternate possibility. In essence, he did many of the steps that made the British East India company a formidable force within his own country. Could he have been the ruler of India? Could he have forced a split? Ah, but the could's of history are many, and while worth pondering, require more than off-the-top of my head knowledge. Maybe another day.

I hope therefore you have an idea of why Tipu Sultan is worthy of my brother's report. An impressive man, a cruel man, a blood-soaked man, a great ruler, essentially an important historical figure, with all the ambivalence of history carried in his name.

History = Awesome

The most perfect equation in history, History = Awesome.

To cite proof:

A History of the Spanish Inquisition

A History of the French Revolution

A History of Alexander Hamilton

A History of Dance

And for you real history buffs, a piece of history that's mostly accurate:

A History of Macross

I realize I have been lax in my posting duties, and I don't see that changing, but the web is wide, and history is out there. Go Forth I Command Thee!

Soviet History: More enigma than you can shake a stick at

If I might make a generalization of Soviet History, and bear in mind that I am a man who hates generalizations unless they are poetic or get at the essence of the human experience.

Soviet history is an enigma, an enigma wrapped in a cipher, and smothered in secret sauce.

However, we are still invited from time to time to contemplate it in a manner which defies Mr. James' assertion.

And so I did some time ago in an essay about Soviet foreign policy between the end of the Russian Civil War and the beginning of World War II. However in the brutal process of editing (it is a brutal, brutal business, editing is), I had to shave off a very elegant block of text. However, I have this alternate forum just for such elegant blocks of text and so I thought I might share it with you:

In the Preface to his book, The Soviet Tragedy, Martin Malia writes “With the collapse of 1989-1991, the world that Lenin and Stalin build was no longer even a secret. The intimate record of seventy-four years of utopian experimentation is an open book for all to read.”1 Given that many records have been destroyed and many eye-witnesses killed without note, Malia's assesment is questionable, but it is undeniable that the fall of the Soviet Union unleased a tidal wave of new historical material for Western scholars to page through. However even if we are to assume that the new material constitutes the whole of the “intimate record” of the Soviet Union, understanding the history of the Soviet Union is still a challenging task. Soviet history might now be an “open book” but it is a book written in the language of opaque personas, official and unofficial lies, self-deception and hidden truths, and above all else the intense relationship between the state and the Communist ideology. This language is not translatable by mortals, even if we can see the lines that make up its symbols.
Thus even if the history of the foreign affairs of the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1939 is mostly known, and even if the history of the domestic policies of the Soviet Union between 1921 and 1939 is mostly known, deciphering the relationship between the two is a matter of speculation rather than fact. Still speculation can be made. What need not be speculated is that the Soviet Union was built on the idea of war between capitalism and communism. The USSR was designed to be the first in the world revolution. This precept can be found publicly in all the ideologies of the Soviet leaders, and more privately in their planning and geopolitical thought. However, what is less certain is whether this war was a matter of immenent conflict or far away victory for the Soviet leaders.

A nice little paragraph or two non?

Easter

Sorry for the long time with no post, but various matters have kept me busy on various things.

Easter, however, is another matter where I am tempted to stay busy, so for right now, I don't have time to post more than to say:

Hi!

Bye!

When history's being abused, who you going to call?

I have a low tolerance for history abuse. That is when people misquote or misinterpret history especially when they think they know a lot. Yet I try to restrain myself from being too self-righteous because self-righteousness is usually the first step towards history abuse, and my love of history is pure and unblemished.

Still there are times when I can clearly and without reservation identify an act as history abuse, and one act I can identify as thus is the casual throwing around of Hitler references. There is nothing casual about Hitler. Depending on how you view him, he might be a man of an extraordinarily monstrously twisted mind, a man of exceptional evil, a force of horrible tragedy, or perhaps just a product of the absolute worst mankind has to offer.

BUT HE IS NOT CASUAL! And he cannot be causally referenced. And yet Hitler references are just always, always thrown around. It used to be only liberals would throw around Hitler references but now conservatives, centrists and the apolitical do as well. A casualization of the horror of Hitler is coming over the world, and that fact holds the potential to begin a forgetting of the greatest of evils mankind has been capable of, the Holocaust. But if I sound too serious, and I might, let me punch it up a little by saying that I usually just find people who throw around Hitler references more silly than anything else, and a good reply to that is one that has a bit of that silliness.

So thus, with no further ado, I present Mr. Jon Stewart's utterly perfect reply to the explosion of Hitler references in the world today:

A Relatively Closer Look at Hitler - The Daily Show

So remember kids, whenever you're thinking about saying someone's like Hitler, remember who's really like Hitler... Hitler.

That's what I'm talking about

I've got to read this guy's book now, because this is exactly the right answer to any Indian who is surprised that I'm a history major instead of a science major or anyone else who's surprised at my history major.
This is an interview with William Dalrymple in the Hindu.

See that's what I'm talking about.

The Beginning of an Empire

One of the topics that's always intrigued me is the colonization of India. That's not too surprising considering my Indian lineage, but in fact my family experienced little of the colonization directly. My grandparents lived in areas of India that were either princely states or lightly governed, and the major impact of the independence movement on S. India, that is the impact it had on the caste system in S. India was also removed from my grandparents given that they were Christian. That is not to say my ancestors were removed from history, there were probably some indirect effects of the independence movement on my grandparents, but the bigger historical influence on my forefathers was the reunification of a branch of the Malankara Orthodox Church with the Catholic Church. Of course, with my parents themselves the post-independence history had an effect, but I am digressing in a majorly fashion.

As I said how a joint-stock company crafted a major empire over one of the most ancient areas of civilization on earth while the only other major area of colonization was in the Americas is an oft wondered question for me.

I hesitate to offer a speculation just yet, especially since I have been around professors who have speculated much better about the matter. But I offer this:

The rise of the British East India Company must be taken within the background of the decline and disintegration of the Mughal Empire.

Now up to 1707 the Mughal Emprie was one of the most powerful empires in the world.
Yet within a decade later, its decline had become epidemic.

1717 is often cited as one of the dates marking the beginning of the British East India Company's rise, but I think it would be useful to put this date in context.

In reference to the British East India Company, 1717 marks the date when the Mughal Emperor Farrukhsiyar completely waived trading dues (well, in exchange for 3000 rupees a yr.) for British East India Company trade in Bengal and gave them a grant of 38 villages near Calcutta. This would firmly establish them in the Bengal trading/military scene which would lead to their first major conquest, the Presidency of Bengal.

Yet let's take a look at 1717.

This was also the year the Mughals signed a treaty acknowledging Maratha Empire rule over the Deccan in exchange for nominal overlordship and annual taxes. Considering a little more than 30 years earlier the Mughal Empire had executed the Maratha Paramount Ruler who was then considered a rebel, 1717 is a year marking the incredible decline of Mughal authority.

A little more context:

Emperor Farrukhsiyar was to some degree a puppet of the more able, but less legitimate (as imperial legitimacy goes) Saiyid Brothers, major power brokers of the Mughal court whose struggle for dominance was a key factor in the weakening of Mughal rule.

This era also saw the Mughals struggling to repel advances by the Sikh Confederacy, the Sikhs were repelled by 1716 but even afterwards Sikh rebellions and eventually independence would fatally weaken Mughal strength in NW India.

Furthermore, in Bengal itself Mughal authority was questionable.

Thus while the East India Company got a grant of villages near Calcutta in 1717, despite the orders of the Mughal Emperor, their grant of duty-free trade was ignored by many of Bengal governor who would later become Marathas with only a nominal allegiance with the Mughal court.

Thus the decline of the Mughal Empire must be seen as vital in the circumstances that allowed for the rise of the British East India Company. But is that enough of an explanation?

Doubt it.

I hope to go into more of this in my chronology of India, but here's another factor:

The Maratha Empire, which supplanted the Mughal Empire as India's dominant power, was never able to establish a firm centralization and is often called the Maratha Confederacy. Furthermore, even before coming into major conflict with the British East India Company, in 1761 the Maratha Empire was dealt a huge blow to its stability by an invasion from the growing Durrani Empire, the predecessor to the modern state of Afghanistan. The Afghanis did not keep their advances, but they did do a pretty major pillaging job.

This has been a classic NW India problem, being right next to a major imperial area (Persia whose influence on Central Asia often caused imperial rises or destablizations, India itself was often an imperial player in Central Asia). NW India was in somewhat better shape but often had to deal with the impact of the changing fate of the Burmanese Empire.

But all this information is a bit thick and a bit speculative, which is why I shall continue work on my chronology to hit both those fronts.

Only then can the history cometh.

India, A Chronology: Prologue

Greetings, good readers!
Now I am not normally one to put up large blocks of names and dates, but I have done just that in my previous post. The reason why is that I feel that good hard names and dates, especially in regards to India, a country dear to my heart, are often lacking in these modern times.

Recent teaching methodology has dismissed the importance of names and dates and I agree to a degree. The essence of history is not names and dates, but the stories. The rich strands of narratives that drive forward events and ultimately make up who we are, that is what history is truly about! Often bombarding kids with names and dates will just alienate them from the true core of history. Yet names and dates are valuable. If a person can recall names and dates without any hesitation, his or her analytical thoughts can flow without interruption. I have never mastered that level of memorization but I still find knowing a few names and dates off the top of my head is a very valuable trick.

But what intrigued me most about names and dates in regards to India, is how much the historiography of India has been dominated by ideas of general forces, overall trends, and vague cultural assessments. I am not disagreeing with that school of historiography, or even that general forces drive history, but without grounding these general ideas in names and dates, historical analysis becomes mere speculation. Names and dates can often concretely link events and paint out a picture of what exactly is happening so that clear and concrete trends can be deciphered. And even when broad trends are apparent, having precise names and dates to back them up can help shut down any cliquish resistance.

Now, do not get the idea that I am making some grand criticism of historical research done in the past about India. I have great respect for most India scholars, both Indian and non-Indian, in the field today. All I want to do is add a tool to their and my investigative endeavors, and thus I am attempting to make an easy to use, easy to read chronology of India. By necessity, due to the intertwined nature of national histories, I am covering to some degree regional history, but my main focus is on India. Perhaps if I have the time I will put some effort on covering the chronology of other lands, but for now India is my destination. So let us go, post-haste!

India, a Chronology: Part I

1498 - Portuguese under Vasco da Gamma arrive at Kappad (near Calicut (Kozhikode), Kerala) in the kingdom of Saamoothiri (I'm unsure if this is the name of the kingdom, but it is at least the name of the ruler, the kingdom centered on Calicut and ruled over the surrounding areas of Kerala). Establishing the trade route between Portugal and India via the Horn of Africa (there are some sources which suggest that Greeks knew of this route before hand, but none of the sources are very strong).

1510 - Portuguese under Afonso de Albuquerque capture Goa and establish a Portuguese colony in the city of Goa and its surrounding area.

1600 - British East India Company founded as a joint-stock company with a 15-year monopoly over British trade in the East Indies (India and SE Asia) in its founding charter, granted by Queen Elizabeth.

1602 - Dutch East India Company founded (VOC based on its Dutch initials) as a joint-stock company with a 21-year monopoly over Dutch trade in the East Indies in its founding charter, granted by the Dutch States-General.

1605 - Mughal Emperor Jahangir begins reign.

1605-1627 - Reign of Mughal Emperor Jahangir

1619 - Mughal Emperor Jahangir grants the British East India Company permission to trade in his territories at Surat (in Gujarat).

1627 - Death of Mughal Emperor Jahangir

1627 - Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan begins reign

1627-1658 - Reign of Shah Jahan

1639 - First British factory in India established at Madras, then called Fort St. George. It was a factory in the sense of the word meaning warehouse.

1658 - Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan overthrown by his son, Aurangzeb. Beginning of the reign of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb.

1658-1707 - Reign of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb