Greetings, good readers!
Now I am not normally one to put up large blocks of names and dates, but I have done just that in my previous post. The reason why is that I feel that good hard names and dates, especially in regards to India, a country dear to my heart, are often lacking in these modern times.
Recent teaching methodology has dismissed the importance of names and dates and I agree to a degree. The essence of history is not names and dates, but the stories. The rich strands of narratives that drive forward events and ultimately make up who we are, that is what history is truly about! Often bombarding kids with names and dates will just alienate them from the true core of history. Yet names and dates are valuable. If a person can recall names and dates without any hesitation, his or her analytical thoughts can flow without interruption. I have never mastered that level of memorization but I still find knowing a few names and dates off the top of my head is a very valuable trick.
But what intrigued me most about names and dates in regards to India, is how much the historiography of India has been dominated by ideas of general forces, overall trends, and vague cultural assessments. I am not disagreeing with that school of historiography, or even that general forces drive history, but without grounding these general ideas in names and dates, historical analysis becomes mere speculation. Names and dates can often concretely link events and paint out a picture of what exactly is happening so that clear and concrete trends can be deciphered. And even when broad trends are apparent, having precise names and dates to back them up can help shut down any cliquish resistance.
Now, do not get the idea that I am making some grand criticism of historical research done in the past about India. I have great respect for most India scholars, both Indian and non-Indian, in the field today. All I want to do is add a tool to their and my investigative endeavors, and thus I am attempting to make an easy to use, easy to read chronology of India. By necessity, due to the intertwined nature of national histories, I am covering to some degree regional history, but my main focus is on India. Perhaps if I have the time I will put some effort on covering the chronology of other lands, but for now India is my destination. So let us go, post-haste!
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
Sunday, February 24, 2008
India, a Chronology: Part I
1498 - Portuguese under Vasco da Gamma arrive at Kappad (near Calicut (Kozhikode), Kerala) in the kingdom of Saamoothiri (I'm unsure if this is the name of the kingdom, but it is at least the name of the ruler, the kingdom centered on Calicut and ruled over the surrounding areas of Kerala). Establishing the trade route between Portugal and India via the Horn of Africa (there are some sources which suggest that Greeks knew of this route before hand, but none of the sources are very strong).
1510 - Portuguese under Afonso de Albuquerque capture Goa and establish a Portuguese colony in the city of Goa and its surrounding area.
1600 - British East India Company founded as a joint-stock company with a 15-year monopoly over British trade in the East Indies (India and SE Asia) in its founding charter, granted by Queen Elizabeth.
1602 - Dutch East India Company founded (VOC based on its Dutch initials) as a joint-stock company with a 21-year monopoly over Dutch trade in the East Indies in its founding charter, granted by the Dutch States-General.
1605 - Mughal Emperor Jahangir begins reign.
1605-1627 - Reign of Mughal Emperor Jahangir
1619 - Mughal Emperor Jahangir grants the British East India Company permission to trade in his territories at Surat (in Gujarat).
1627 - Death of Mughal Emperor Jahangir
1627 - Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan begins reign
1627-1658 - Reign of Shah Jahan
1639 - First British factory in India established at Madras, then called Fort St. George. It was a factory in the sense of the word meaning warehouse.
1658 - Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan overthrown by his son, Aurangzeb. Beginning of the reign of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb.
1658-1707 - Reign of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb
1510 - Portuguese under Afonso de Albuquerque capture Goa and establish a Portuguese colony in the city of Goa and its surrounding area.
1600 - British East India Company founded as a joint-stock company with a 15-year monopoly over British trade in the East Indies (India and SE Asia) in its founding charter, granted by Queen Elizabeth.
1602 - Dutch East India Company founded (VOC based on its Dutch initials) as a joint-stock company with a 21-year monopoly over Dutch trade in the East Indies in its founding charter, granted by the Dutch States-General.
1605 - Mughal Emperor Jahangir begins reign.
1605-1627 - Reign of Mughal Emperor Jahangir
1619 - Mughal Emperor Jahangir grants the British East India Company permission to trade in his territories at Surat (in Gujarat).
1627 - Death of Mughal Emperor Jahangir
1627 - Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan begins reign
1627-1658 - Reign of Shah Jahan
1639 - First British factory in India established at Madras, then called Fort St. George. It was a factory in the sense of the word meaning warehouse.
1658 - Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan overthrown by his son, Aurangzeb. Beginning of the reign of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb.
1658-1707 - Reign of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb
Saturday, February 23, 2008
History repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce
No I hate Marx, on several levels (ah I'm kidding Karlly-boy, I love you, I just hate your murderous ideology), but I got to admit he occasionally, when he wants to, he can turn a nice phrase (of course when he doesn't want to, you can end up with something like Das Kapital, which 99% of the world can bear reading, and 1% of the world pretends to read).
But whenever you think of Napoleon III, nothing seems to fit better. Yet, that typical assessment misses how important Napoleon III really was to world history.
Just on the bare bones:
He brought down the Second Republic of France, furthering the French tradition of chronically unstable and periodically radical governments.
He reignited foreign adventurism by helping to push forward the Crimean War. While this war can be looked from a purely Russia-Ottoman standpoint, the entire 19th century and most of the 18th century were constant Russia-Ottoman conflicts, what made this one unique was the French and British military intervention (as opposed to later diplomatic interventions), which owes itself in a great deal to Napoleon III.
He furthered the idea of colonialism for prestige and honor + the idea of colonial paternalism in his policies in Algeria, Vietnam, and the Middle East.
He brought European politics back to the Americas with his intervention in Mexico.
He helped destablize the European power-balance by encouraging the emergence of Italy and generally backing nationalism movements and lobbying for a first place of France beyond the Concert of Europe.
He was perhaps the first of the modernizing conservatives. Essentially radical in their embrace of modernity and their embrace of nationalism, essentially conservative in their views on rights and on personal values. The basic tenant of figures like Napoleon III, who would haunt the late 19th century as well as the whole of the 20th century, was that the nation must be made great and strong, while the people must be kept orderly and moral.
In Napoleon III, there is the model for more than 100 years of brutal modernizers who did it all in the name of the nation. In that company, he does seem like a little bit of a farce. But he created a modern but unstable France, he helped create a nationalistic but unstable Europe, and he helped create a world being consumed by the need for glory, honor, and a place in the sun.
So in the end, history repeated itself twice as tragedy.
But whenever you think of Napoleon III, nothing seems to fit better. Yet, that typical assessment misses how important Napoleon III really was to world history.
Just on the bare bones:
He brought down the Second Republic of France, furthering the French tradition of chronically unstable and periodically radical governments.
He reignited foreign adventurism by helping to push forward the Crimean War. While this war can be looked from a purely Russia-Ottoman standpoint, the entire 19th century and most of the 18th century were constant Russia-Ottoman conflicts, what made this one unique was the French and British military intervention (as opposed to later diplomatic interventions), which owes itself in a great deal to Napoleon III.
He furthered the idea of colonialism for prestige and honor + the idea of colonial paternalism in his policies in Algeria, Vietnam, and the Middle East.
He brought European politics back to the Americas with his intervention in Mexico.
He helped destablize the European power-balance by encouraging the emergence of Italy and generally backing nationalism movements and lobbying for a first place of France beyond the Concert of Europe.
He was perhaps the first of the modernizing conservatives. Essentially radical in their embrace of modernity and their embrace of nationalism, essentially conservative in their views on rights and on personal values. The basic tenant of figures like Napoleon III, who would haunt the late 19th century as well as the whole of the 20th century, was that the nation must be made great and strong, while the people must be kept orderly and moral.
In Napoleon III, there is the model for more than 100 years of brutal modernizers who did it all in the name of the nation. In that company, he does seem like a little bit of a farce. But he created a modern but unstable France, he helped create a nationalistic but unstable Europe, and he helped create a world being consumed by the need for glory, honor, and a place in the sun.
So in the end, history repeated itself twice as tragedy.
Friday, February 22, 2008
Cause the History don't stop coming
My apologies for not keeping a regular schedule... but does history keep a regular schedule?
Nonetheless I will try to post on a more regular rate.
Alas, I cannot regale you with a full post today, but instead I invite you to ponder something.
Why is it so easy to make a conspiracy theory?
You take any given important event, you give anyone with the intelligence of a 3rd grader an excuse, and you can get a convoluted conspiracy that will be on the web within 13 minutes. Why is it so easy?
My answer: Two things, first history is complex. It is the sum of all human activity, except then you have all that interacting with itself in ways that cannot possibly be completely documented. Infinite complexity + finite minds = confusion, and confusion + desire not to be confused = lame excuse = conspiracy theory. It's quite simple math.
Secondly, history has a lot of interrelated factors. When one thing, like say the cultural fortunes of an ethnic group, goes up, a whole horde of other things, like say a school of thought, a city's economic situation, or say a politician's national standing, all are affected. And this is because there are links, not sinister links mind you, but just natural links between each person, and since history affects people, those links affect other people, and then since people affect history, history is altered again.
Basically, history creates a really big feedback loop with... well, everything.
Thus with a giant mess of links and connections, it's easy to pick out one or two, trace them up through the ages, and then say "My God, this is the secret to all history!"
Then you take things that don't quite fit and you squish them a little, and then a little more, and then a little more, until you get a whole bunch of convoluted conspiracies.
Let me take an example. Every country has either more sheep or more cows. Thus if you line up every bi-lateral conflict in history you have a conflict between sheep-owners and cow-owners. However, multi-national alliances might confuse things, but if you look at the upper elite, you'll notice certain connections to religious orders, political clubs, ethnic groups or some other grouping, I mean everyone has groups, and probably that can give a clearer cow/sheep backing line. Conclusion: All war is caused by the conflict between cows and sheep.
But perhaps I missed the most pressing reason for conspiracies. It's comforting to think everything fits within a neat logic. If there are clear lines of interest, clear villians, clear crimes, and clear tragedies, life's a lot simpler and easier to handle.
But a historian's job is not to make life easy to handle, it is to actually handle the whole of life.
Nonetheless I will try to post on a more regular rate.
Alas, I cannot regale you with a full post today, but instead I invite you to ponder something.
Why is it so easy to make a conspiracy theory?
You take any given important event, you give anyone with the intelligence of a 3rd grader an excuse, and you can get a convoluted conspiracy that will be on the web within 13 minutes. Why is it so easy?
My answer: Two things, first history is complex. It is the sum of all human activity, except then you have all that interacting with itself in ways that cannot possibly be completely documented. Infinite complexity + finite minds = confusion, and confusion + desire not to be confused = lame excuse = conspiracy theory. It's quite simple math.
Secondly, history has a lot of interrelated factors. When one thing, like say the cultural fortunes of an ethnic group, goes up, a whole horde of other things, like say a school of thought, a city's economic situation, or say a politician's national standing, all are affected. And this is because there are links, not sinister links mind you, but just natural links between each person, and since history affects people, those links affect other people, and then since people affect history, history is altered again.
Basically, history creates a really big feedback loop with... well, everything.
Thus with a giant mess of links and connections, it's easy to pick out one or two, trace them up through the ages, and then say "My God, this is the secret to all history!"
Then you take things that don't quite fit and you squish them a little, and then a little more, and then a little more, until you get a whole bunch of convoluted conspiracies.
Let me take an example. Every country has either more sheep or more cows. Thus if you line up every bi-lateral conflict in history you have a conflict between sheep-owners and cow-owners. However, multi-national alliances might confuse things, but if you look at the upper elite, you'll notice certain connections to religious orders, political clubs, ethnic groups or some other grouping, I mean everyone has groups, and probably that can give a clearer cow/sheep backing line. Conclusion: All war is caused by the conflict between cows and sheep.
But perhaps I missed the most pressing reason for conspiracies. It's comforting to think everything fits within a neat logic. If there are clear lines of interest, clear villians, clear crimes, and clear tragedies, life's a lot simpler and easier to handle.
But a historian's job is not to make life easy to handle, it is to actually handle the whole of life.
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Happy St. Valentine's Day!
A holiday is a holy day (although Valentine's Day is no longer technically a holy day, it remains so in my heart), as the word would suggest, but days of holiness have reasons for their holiness and that, my friends, is where the history comes in.
DISCLAIMER: This is going to be somewhat more personal, its going to go on tangents which contain telescoping parentheses, its going to be heavily Catholic, and while I'm going to put in as much history as I can, this is a post about love written by a rank sentimentalist, so be prepared for some rank sentimentalism.
There are a couple fold aspects to St. Valentine's Day. Firstly, as many classicists will emphasize, the holiday takes the place of a popular Roman holiday, Lupercalia. Like many pagan Roman holiday's its association with the pagan religion made it uncomfortable for Christians to celebrate and difficult for potential converts to give up.
(Would they have to give it up? If I might point out some Christian precedent, this situation is somewhat similar to eating food that has been offered up to idols, ie, enjoying the benefits of pagan ceremonies without participating in the pagan part, and this situation was a historical dilemma for Christians. The solution however, can be seen in the First Letter of Paul to the Corithians. He says that in his view it is not a sin to eat food offered to idols, although if the Christian worried that it might be a sin, then it would be a sin because he or she would be choosing pleasure over potential sin. Thus my view is that enjoying the celebrations of a pagan holiday without having any sort of reverent attitude to the religion that sparked the celebration would not be a sin, however, if the Christians were ambivalent and worried about the potential sinful nature of the holiday, then precedent holds they should probably not participate, and this likely was the case of many Christians in the Roman world with Lupercailia, hence the dilemma.)
But while the celebration of Lupercalia was primarily of fertility (in this it was also a celebration of spring, similar to those present in many other cultures, perhaps explaining why its replacement spread so fast), it also had aspects of celebrating love, and love was (and is) a hugely important theological principle among Christians.
(while Jesus himself talked about love, the most famous theological speculation after Jesus about love was St. Paul's in his First Letter to the Corinthians)
Thus a logical way out was to change the celebration from fertility to love, and to secure the new emphasis, no longer was the celebration commemorating the abduction (essentially rape, but to be fair marriage by abduction was practiced by many cultures in the ancient world) of the Sabine women by the early founders of Rome (a more exact explanation of Lupercalia can be found in this page by Professor James Grout of U. Chicago), but rather now the emphasis was on a saint who embodied love. Yet to not break completely from the fertility celebration, the saint had to be one of marital and romantic love. The question of if this saint was real or was just folklore or was even invented so that there could be a saint of marital and romantic love is still debated among historians, but I find it of less importance. The importance of the holiday is romantic love, which good marital love hopefully has, and so instead of joining that debate, I instead direct you to a good place to check out the various stories of several, perhaps real, saints called Valentine who are celebrated on this holiday.
And here's a little more on the Catholic perspective on St. Valentine's Day (if I'm seeming a little uber-Catholic today, well it's because I am uber-Catholic and as I said holiday has historically and literally meant holy day). By the way, the previous Catholic site I directed you to comes from the 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia, a good resource (the early 20th century encyclopedias, many of whom are on the web and public domain, represented a different age in encyclopedia making, when it was not just about knowledge (not that there's anything wrong with solely-knowledge-centric encyclopedias) but also about fine writing and that's why a lot of people still like them despite their age) but a bit out of date, this second Catholic site is from AmericanCatholic.org and is up-to-date, for example, it notes that St. Valentine's Day has been taken out of the Catholic Liturgical Calender.
And for you Valentine's Day haters out there, here's a Christian anti-Valentine's Day site (although it's from BibleStudy.org which I feel is a bit Protestant-y) and here's a secular anti-Valentine's Day site. (the secular one's also a bit more bitter and a bit more vulgar, but hey, so are many people (including me occasionally) around Valentine's Day)
My own feelings about the day are not historic (so I'll try to be brief about them), and they might strike some as not strictly Christian (although they are rooted in my faith). I like St. Valentine's Day a lot, I think love is something sacred and grand, and while I do not think romantic love is for everyone, (historically has been acknowledgement that romantic love is not for everyone, see for example, Jesus's words about marriage and divorce) I do believe it is wonderful for those who can find it and have the capacity to embrace it. I hope someday to fall into the latter category myself some day.
And if I do not have anyone to celebrate the majesty and mystery of romantic love, well, at least I can raise a toast to it. Because it really is good stuff, after all, were it not for romantic love, none of use would even be here.
DISCLAIMER: This is going to be somewhat more personal, its going to go on tangents which contain telescoping parentheses, its going to be heavily Catholic, and while I'm going to put in as much history as I can, this is a post about love written by a rank sentimentalist, so be prepared for some rank sentimentalism.
There are a couple fold aspects to St. Valentine's Day. Firstly, as many classicists will emphasize, the holiday takes the place of a popular Roman holiday, Lupercalia. Like many pagan Roman holiday's its association with the pagan religion made it uncomfortable for Christians to celebrate and difficult for potential converts to give up.
(Would they have to give it up? If I might point out some Christian precedent, this situation is somewhat similar to eating food that has been offered up to idols, ie, enjoying the benefits of pagan ceremonies without participating in the pagan part, and this situation was a historical dilemma for Christians. The solution however, can be seen in the First Letter of Paul to the Corithians. He says that in his view it is not a sin to eat food offered to idols, although if the Christian worried that it might be a sin, then it would be a sin because he or she would be choosing pleasure over potential sin. Thus my view is that enjoying the celebrations of a pagan holiday without having any sort of reverent attitude to the religion that sparked the celebration would not be a sin, however, if the Christians were ambivalent and worried about the potential sinful nature of the holiday, then precedent holds they should probably not participate, and this likely was the case of many Christians in the Roman world with Lupercailia, hence the dilemma.)
But while the celebration of Lupercalia was primarily of fertility (in this it was also a celebration of spring, similar to those present in many other cultures, perhaps explaining why its replacement spread so fast), it also had aspects of celebrating love, and love was (and is) a hugely important theological principle among Christians.
(while Jesus himself talked about love, the most famous theological speculation after Jesus about love was St. Paul's in his First Letter to the Corinthians)
Thus a logical way out was to change the celebration from fertility to love, and to secure the new emphasis, no longer was the celebration commemorating the abduction (essentially rape, but to be fair marriage by abduction was practiced by many cultures in the ancient world) of the Sabine women by the early founders of Rome (a more exact explanation of Lupercalia can be found in this page by Professor James Grout of U. Chicago), but rather now the emphasis was on a saint who embodied love. Yet to not break completely from the fertility celebration, the saint had to be one of marital and romantic love. The question of if this saint was real or was just folklore or was even invented so that there could be a saint of marital and romantic love is still debated among historians, but I find it of less importance. The importance of the holiday is romantic love, which good marital love hopefully has, and so instead of joining that debate, I instead direct you to a good place to check out the various stories of several, perhaps real, saints called Valentine who are celebrated on this holiday.
And here's a little more on the Catholic perspective on St. Valentine's Day (if I'm seeming a little uber-Catholic today, well it's because I am uber-Catholic and as I said holiday has historically and literally meant holy day). By the way, the previous Catholic site I directed you to comes from the 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia, a good resource (the early 20th century encyclopedias, many of whom are on the web and public domain, represented a different age in encyclopedia making, when it was not just about knowledge (not that there's anything wrong with solely-knowledge-centric encyclopedias) but also about fine writing and that's why a lot of people still like them despite their age) but a bit out of date, this second Catholic site is from AmericanCatholic.org and is up-to-date, for example, it notes that St. Valentine's Day has been taken out of the Catholic Liturgical Calender.
And for you Valentine's Day haters out there, here's a Christian anti-Valentine's Day site (although it's from BibleStudy.org which I feel is a bit Protestant-y) and here's a secular anti-Valentine's Day site. (the secular one's also a bit more bitter and a bit more vulgar, but hey, so are many people (including me occasionally) around Valentine's Day)
My own feelings about the day are not historic (so I'll try to be brief about them), and they might strike some as not strictly Christian (although they are rooted in my faith). I like St. Valentine's Day a lot, I think love is something sacred and grand, and while I do not think romantic love is for everyone, (historically has been acknowledgement that romantic love is not for everyone, see for example, Jesus's words about marriage and divorce) I do believe it is wonderful for those who can find it and have the capacity to embrace it. I hope someday to fall into the latter category myself some day.
And if I do not have anyone to celebrate the majesty and mystery of romantic love, well, at least I can raise a toast to it. Because it really is good stuff, after all, were it not for romantic love, none of use would even be here.
Wednesday, February 13, 2008
Istanbul once Constantinople
Now as that song goes Istanbul was once Constantinople, but although many suppose this happened just when Constantinople was taken by the Ottoman Empire, but no, it was only after the Ottoman Empire fell did Istanbul become Constantinople. Why?
Nobody knows but the Turks.
Actually it was probably just a matter of nationalism. Afterall if one force was driving the end of the Ottoman Empire it was an explosion of conflicting nationalist impulses. If there was an inherent difference between the revolutions which doomed the German Empire and Russian Empire and the revolutions that doomed the Chinese Empire and the Ottoman Empire is that G and R rev.s were driven by socialists, while C and O rev.s were primarily nationalist driven. One could say that as a matter of development. But that's far, far too simplistic.
First of all, the socialists in the G and R rev.s were often somewhat nationalistic, even if they hid it. Part of the appeal of socialism is its promise of making your nation the forefront of development and that was very much in the mind of those revolutionaries. Also, there was a far left presence in the Chinese and Ottoman revolutions, especially in the Chinese case. But a good counter-example to the claim that the differences were due to development or perhaps due to geography was the example of the Austro-Hungarian revolutions, which while sometimes Communist (notably in Hungry) were often first and foremost nationalist.
The key point the Chinese, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian Empires shared was their multi-national composition, and unlike the Russian Empire, their diversity was to the point where the ruling ethnicity was far from the majority. This was particularly acute in the case of the Chinese who were ruled by a thin layer of Manchus. This made it easy to direct the revolutionary impulse into a nationalist one, because the struggle to modernize which often drove much of the dissatisfaction in these governments could be portrayed as a struggle between an oppressed nation and a foreign ruler. It is notable that in the Russian rev., the Tsarina was often emphasized as German for a similar effect.
But the difference between the Chinese rev. and all the others is that the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, German and Russian empires all collapsed in World War I. Three of the four, minus the Germans, struggled deeply and largely unsuccessfully with modernization. The Germans on the other hand were successful. Yet all had to deal with restive minorities, although the Germans less than most. The fates of the revolutions were different though. Turkey's revolution led to a moderately authoritarian but stable modernizing government, Russia's revolution broke off sections into independent states but most become the USSR, the Austro-Hungarian revolution shattered the empire into small states, each with an unstable mix of nationalism and socialism. And the Germans...
The Germans were left with an unstable democracy which under better circumstances might have stabilized (after all, France had a chronically unstable democracy since 1870, but it remained democratic), but instead spiraled into the hell which was Nazism.
Nobody knows but the Turks.
Actually it was probably just a matter of nationalism. Afterall if one force was driving the end of the Ottoman Empire it was an explosion of conflicting nationalist impulses. If there was an inherent difference between the revolutions which doomed the German Empire and Russian Empire and the revolutions that doomed the Chinese Empire and the Ottoman Empire is that G and R rev.s were driven by socialists, while C and O rev.s were primarily nationalist driven. One could say that as a matter of development. But that's far, far too simplistic.
First of all, the socialists in the G and R rev.s were often somewhat nationalistic, even if they hid it. Part of the appeal of socialism is its promise of making your nation the forefront of development and that was very much in the mind of those revolutionaries. Also, there was a far left presence in the Chinese and Ottoman revolutions, especially in the Chinese case. But a good counter-example to the claim that the differences were due to development or perhaps due to geography was the example of the Austro-Hungarian revolutions, which while sometimes Communist (notably in Hungry) were often first and foremost nationalist.
The key point the Chinese, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian Empires shared was their multi-national composition, and unlike the Russian Empire, their diversity was to the point where the ruling ethnicity was far from the majority. This was particularly acute in the case of the Chinese who were ruled by a thin layer of Manchus. This made it easy to direct the revolutionary impulse into a nationalist one, because the struggle to modernize which often drove much of the dissatisfaction in these governments could be portrayed as a struggle between an oppressed nation and a foreign ruler. It is notable that in the Russian rev., the Tsarina was often emphasized as German for a similar effect.
But the difference between the Chinese rev. and all the others is that the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, German and Russian empires all collapsed in World War I. Three of the four, minus the Germans, struggled deeply and largely unsuccessfully with modernization. The Germans on the other hand were successful. Yet all had to deal with restive minorities, although the Germans less than most. The fates of the revolutions were different though. Turkey's revolution led to a moderately authoritarian but stable modernizing government, Russia's revolution broke off sections into independent states but most become the USSR, the Austro-Hungarian revolution shattered the empire into small states, each with an unstable mix of nationalism and socialism. And the Germans...
The Germans were left with an unstable democracy which under better circumstances might have stabilized (after all, France had a chronically unstable democracy since 1870, but it remained democratic), but instead spiraled into the hell which was Nazism.
Friday, February 8, 2008
The End of Empires and other such tales
One question that always raises curiosity in my all-too-curious brain is why/how do empires rise and why/how do empires end?
Since this is a topic that can be gone on endlessly, I shall go on endlessly about it, but given my limited time constraints, I will pace myself.
Let's look at one, most particular example of the fall of empires, at the World War I, 4 empires: The German Empire, The Russian Empire, The Austro-Hungarian Empire, and The Ottoman Empire collapsed.
Was it do to the war? Maybe, there's a lot of evidence both ways. Since I'm obliged by class to write an essay on the topic in regards to the Russian Empire (likely I will at least), I'll try to share my insights on that.
Throwing out some context info: While those 4 empires fell at the end of WWI, this was the height of imperial empires, and the world's second largest empire fell before WWI: The Qing Chinese Empire started its collapse in 1911, although after effects of WWI ended up contributing to the chaos, its collapse could not be do to WWI which only started 1914.
But let's just briefly (very briefly do to time, and not enough analysis done/looked up on the topic) look at some compare and contrasts between the 4 WWI end of empire scenarios (starting with the German Empire, and I'll fill in the others tomorrow/later):
German Empire:
This empire came closest and might even qualify as a nation-state rather than an empire, however, the ruling ideology was still imperial, with ultimate power and the source of power in the monarch's hands. Also, the German Empire had a large minority of Poles and some other assorted Slavs, as well as a smaller minority of Danes.
It was also a colonial empire, with colonies in the Pacific (throughout but most notably in New Guinea), SW Africa (now Nambia), W. Africa (Togo, part of Ghana, and Cameroon), C. Africa (Rwanda and Burundi) and E. Africa (now Tanzania (excluding Zanzibar)). There were also colonial spheres of influence in China, and semi-colonial partnerships in the Balkans (Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire).
It collapsed into a mess:
The Polish portion and a corridor of majority German territory leading to the sea became part of Poland. Denmark took the Dane-majority portion, although there was still a tiny Danish minority. Still compared to the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires after WWI, this was smaller scale.
The German portion was taken over by the Social Democrats. A more radical uprising is put down by returning soldiers (in contrast to the Russian situation where the returning soldiers help carry out the revolution). Briefly a Communist state is established in Bavaria but this too is put down by the returning soldiers.
The fact that many Germans had been left out of the new state (although many Germans had been left out of Germany from its start), helped fuel the dream of reconquest, helping to bolster extreme nationalism.
In terms of human loss, cultural dislocation, and economic damage, Germany was immensely ruined after WWI.
That's a short snap-shot of the fall of the German Empire.
Why did it fall? That's another story for some time that is not now.
Since this is a topic that can be gone on endlessly, I shall go on endlessly about it, but given my limited time constraints, I will pace myself.
Let's look at one, most particular example of the fall of empires, at the World War I, 4 empires: The German Empire, The Russian Empire, The Austro-Hungarian Empire, and The Ottoman Empire collapsed.
Was it do to the war? Maybe, there's a lot of evidence both ways. Since I'm obliged by class to write an essay on the topic in regards to the Russian Empire (likely I will at least), I'll try to share my insights on that.
Throwing out some context info: While those 4 empires fell at the end of WWI, this was the height of imperial empires, and the world's second largest empire fell before WWI: The Qing Chinese Empire started its collapse in 1911, although after effects of WWI ended up contributing to the chaos, its collapse could not be do to WWI which only started 1914.
But let's just briefly (very briefly do to time, and not enough analysis done/looked up on the topic) look at some compare and contrasts between the 4 WWI end of empire scenarios (starting with the German Empire, and I'll fill in the others tomorrow/later):
German Empire:
This empire came closest and might even qualify as a nation-state rather than an empire, however, the ruling ideology was still imperial, with ultimate power and the source of power in the monarch's hands. Also, the German Empire had a large minority of Poles and some other assorted Slavs, as well as a smaller minority of Danes.
It was also a colonial empire, with colonies in the Pacific (throughout but most notably in New Guinea), SW Africa (now Nambia), W. Africa (Togo, part of Ghana, and Cameroon), C. Africa (Rwanda and Burundi) and E. Africa (now Tanzania (excluding Zanzibar)). There were also colonial spheres of influence in China, and semi-colonial partnerships in the Balkans (Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire).
It collapsed into a mess:
The Polish portion and a corridor of majority German territory leading to the sea became part of Poland. Denmark took the Dane-majority portion, although there was still a tiny Danish minority. Still compared to the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires after WWI, this was smaller scale.
The German portion was taken over by the Social Democrats. A more radical uprising is put down by returning soldiers (in contrast to the Russian situation where the returning soldiers help carry out the revolution). Briefly a Communist state is established in Bavaria but this too is put down by the returning soldiers.
The fact that many Germans had been left out of the new state (although many Germans had been left out of Germany from its start), helped fuel the dream of reconquest, helping to bolster extreme nationalism.
In terms of human loss, cultural dislocation, and economic damage, Germany was immensely ruined after WWI.
That's a short snap-shot of the fall of the German Empire.
Why did it fall? That's another story for some time that is not now.
Thursday, February 7, 2008
And what of the Oriental in America?
My deep apologies for my absence for so long, especially given the youthful state of this blog, but matters prompt me to here and there and everywhere.
So I'm not going to be able to make this session as deep as I'd like, so maybe I'll revisit later, but since I mentioned Orientalism in my last session, I thought I might discuss it a little more. To be exact I wanted to discuss Orientalism in light of the fact that I am of Indian heritage and thus, if Orientalism is as prevalent as Said claims, I am looked up by the West as an Oriental.
I am certainly not an Oriental in the same sense Said is. The Arab world, in particular the Palestinian world, is very different than the Indian world, in particular the Malayali world (although there are some claims that Malayalis, including myself have a little Syrian blood in them). But Orientalism, as a perspective, doesn't make such distinctions. So therefore, a country like America, steeped deeply in the European academic traditions, should view me primarily as an Oriental, correct?
I can't say I've ever experienced that. Well, no, I have experienced moments where I've seen Indians and myself treated as generic Orientals. One particular example I like to harp on is the McDonald's Asian Chicken Salad commercial. It basically talked about how the "Asian-ness" of the salad gave you some culinary Nirvana. Obviously the commecial was joking around and I don't pretend otherwise. And while I could see how Buddhists could be offended by the causal throwing around of a sacred concept like Nirvana, Christian concepts like heaven and hell are tossed around in American media with little respect too. What annoyed me though, which might be a little over-reacting, was that it perpetuated the same myth of Asians being inherently mystical, especially in a special "Eastern" way. I find that ridiculous. I know plenty of Asians without a lick of mysticism too them, and while I admit that India has a great spiritual heritage, it is a country and Indians are a people not just some materialization of that spiritual heritage.
Yet such slights always seemed to me minor. Annoying perhaps, offensive perhaps, but not an essentially harmful part of my life. Overall, while my brown-ness was recognized I was not treated any what specially and the label of Oriental did not haunt me.
I am and was, through most of my life, treated as an American.
Perhaps Professor Said had something to do with this, do to the impact of his book. Maybe.
But then there's the other side of the coin, my internal impression of myself. That's a little bit more complicated. One factor that has to enter the mix at some point is that I was raised in a middle-class suburban environment which was largely white. Those who weren't white tended to be lower down on the income ladder. So there was a sort of internal tension between my identity as part of this middle-class American group that was mostly white, and my familial and ethnic identity as an Indian. For example, sometimes I would forget that I was brown and start thinking of myself as white because I associated with the American majority and the American majority was always depicted as white.
If this sounds like a deep psychological issue, I suppose it could be. But its not really. I have over time come to think of myself more and more certainly as Indian and Malayali in an ethnic sense, but more and more I have fixed an identity as American. The internal tension has been lessened by clarifying in my mind what my heritage and my nationality really means to me. My heritage is a shaping force through my history and a network of bonds that links me back in time and across space to others of my historic background. My nationality is a matter of affection, it is not exactly rational but it comes down to a feeling of attachment, identity and love. Clarifying these concepts the internal tension between me as brown and me as a middle-class American has lessened. Has it gone away? Not entirely. Since I remember it and occasionally worry about it, it can never fully remove itself from my mind, but it doesn't concern me much. To be truthful it never concerned me a lot, but in the past it would send spikes of confusion into my mind every now and then, and that is less so the case now.
So I know myself as Indian ethnically but American in nationality. No where there is Oriental. Occasionally I have seen sparks of Orientalism in American culture, but my overall treatment has been as an American and I have accepted that place. Perhaps my view point on these matters is shaded by the fact that I am not a racial essentialist, but race, while an important concept, is just one of many concepts that can add to a person's identity to him/herself and to that person's identity to the outside world. And those two identities need not match.
But the question must come up, fine I feel both like an Indian and an American, but am I right to feel that way? Well, that essentially is a moral question. I can say I'm happy generally, and I find satisfaction in my life, but I'll admit I find my life less invested in my ethnicity than some (notably my parents) might like, and I find my mind filled with paradigms foreign to my ancestors. I am less attached to my heritage than I would be say if I identified myself nationally as Indian, or if I felt that the flashes of Orientalism I find occasionally define the way I have been treated growing up. Yet while I'd like to preserve as much of my heritage as I can, I'm not obsessed with it, and I feel in terms of values, customs, etc., my preferences and internal philosophical debate must come first before adhering to my heritage. Has that view been shaped by culture? Yes. Does that make it less true? Well according to that view, no. There's a moral question of whether putting my own personal ideas before my cultures views is right, but that can't be simply a matter of history, science, or cultural analysis. So are my views on national/ethnic identity correct? I'd say yes, but others might legitimately disagree.
This whole matter may seem like a digression from history. It is. More than a matter of history, what I have written here is a matter of personal introspection. But even that is shaped by history, and my personal perspective undoubtedly shapes my historical perspective. So excuse this indulgence. I simply thought given the fame of Said's story, I'd present the life of another who might be called Oriental in America.
So I'm not going to be able to make this session as deep as I'd like, so maybe I'll revisit later, but since I mentioned Orientalism in my last session, I thought I might discuss it a little more. To be exact I wanted to discuss Orientalism in light of the fact that I am of Indian heritage and thus, if Orientalism is as prevalent as Said claims, I am looked up by the West as an Oriental.
I am certainly not an Oriental in the same sense Said is. The Arab world, in particular the Palestinian world, is very different than the Indian world, in particular the Malayali world (although there are some claims that Malayalis, including myself have a little Syrian blood in them). But Orientalism, as a perspective, doesn't make such distinctions. So therefore, a country like America, steeped deeply in the European academic traditions, should view me primarily as an Oriental, correct?
I can't say I've ever experienced that. Well, no, I have experienced moments where I've seen Indians and myself treated as generic Orientals. One particular example I like to harp on is the McDonald's Asian Chicken Salad commercial. It basically talked about how the "Asian-ness" of the salad gave you some culinary Nirvana. Obviously the commecial was joking around and I don't pretend otherwise. And while I could see how Buddhists could be offended by the causal throwing around of a sacred concept like Nirvana, Christian concepts like heaven and hell are tossed around in American media with little respect too. What annoyed me though, which might be a little over-reacting, was that it perpetuated the same myth of Asians being inherently mystical, especially in a special "Eastern" way. I find that ridiculous. I know plenty of Asians without a lick of mysticism too them, and while I admit that India has a great spiritual heritage, it is a country and Indians are a people not just some materialization of that spiritual heritage.
Yet such slights always seemed to me minor. Annoying perhaps, offensive perhaps, but not an essentially harmful part of my life. Overall, while my brown-ness was recognized I was not treated any what specially and the label of Oriental did not haunt me.
I am and was, through most of my life, treated as an American.
Perhaps Professor Said had something to do with this, do to the impact of his book. Maybe.
But then there's the other side of the coin, my internal impression of myself. That's a little bit more complicated. One factor that has to enter the mix at some point is that I was raised in a middle-class suburban environment which was largely white. Those who weren't white tended to be lower down on the income ladder. So there was a sort of internal tension between my identity as part of this middle-class American group that was mostly white, and my familial and ethnic identity as an Indian. For example, sometimes I would forget that I was brown and start thinking of myself as white because I associated with the American majority and the American majority was always depicted as white.
If this sounds like a deep psychological issue, I suppose it could be. But its not really. I have over time come to think of myself more and more certainly as Indian and Malayali in an ethnic sense, but more and more I have fixed an identity as American. The internal tension has been lessened by clarifying in my mind what my heritage and my nationality really means to me. My heritage is a shaping force through my history and a network of bonds that links me back in time and across space to others of my historic background. My nationality is a matter of affection, it is not exactly rational but it comes down to a feeling of attachment, identity and love. Clarifying these concepts the internal tension between me as brown and me as a middle-class American has lessened. Has it gone away? Not entirely. Since I remember it and occasionally worry about it, it can never fully remove itself from my mind, but it doesn't concern me much. To be truthful it never concerned me a lot, but in the past it would send spikes of confusion into my mind every now and then, and that is less so the case now.
So I know myself as Indian ethnically but American in nationality. No where there is Oriental. Occasionally I have seen sparks of Orientalism in American culture, but my overall treatment has been as an American and I have accepted that place. Perhaps my view point on these matters is shaded by the fact that I am not a racial essentialist, but race, while an important concept, is just one of many concepts that can add to a person's identity to him/herself and to that person's identity to the outside world. And those two identities need not match.
But the question must come up, fine I feel both like an Indian and an American, but am I right to feel that way? Well, that essentially is a moral question. I can say I'm happy generally, and I find satisfaction in my life, but I'll admit I find my life less invested in my ethnicity than some (notably my parents) might like, and I find my mind filled with paradigms foreign to my ancestors. I am less attached to my heritage than I would be say if I identified myself nationally as Indian, or if I felt that the flashes of Orientalism I find occasionally define the way I have been treated growing up. Yet while I'd like to preserve as much of my heritage as I can, I'm not obsessed with it, and I feel in terms of values, customs, etc., my preferences and internal philosophical debate must come first before adhering to my heritage. Has that view been shaped by culture? Yes. Does that make it less true? Well according to that view, no. There's a moral question of whether putting my own personal ideas before my cultures views is right, but that can't be simply a matter of history, science, or cultural analysis. So are my views on national/ethnic identity correct? I'd say yes, but others might legitimately disagree.
This whole matter may seem like a digression from history. It is. More than a matter of history, what I have written here is a matter of personal introspection. But even that is shaped by history, and my personal perspective undoubtedly shapes my historical perspective. So excuse this indulgence. I simply thought given the fame of Said's story, I'd present the life of another who might be called Oriental in America.
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